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Abstract
In (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), we have introduced partial strategyproofness, a
new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness, to study the incentive properties of non-
strategyproof assignment mechanisms. In this paper, we present results pertaining
to local sufficiency for partial strategyproofness: We show that, for any r P r0, 1s,
r-local partial strategyproofness implies r2-partial strategyproofness, and we show
that this is the tightest polynomial bound for which a guarantee can be proven. Our
results unify the two prior local sufficiency results for strategyproofness (Carroll,
2012) and lexicographic dominance-strategyproofness (Cho, 2012).
Keywords: Assignment, Matching, Strategyproofness, Lexicographic Dominance, Par-
tial Strategyproofness, Local Sufficiency
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1. Introduction
We study assignment mechanisms, which are procedures that assign indivisible objects
to agents, taking into account the agents’ preferences over objects but without the use
of monetary transfers. Incentives for truthtelling play an important role in the research
on such mechanism. Stochastic dominance strategyproofness (SD-strategyproofness)
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requires that a mechanism makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for all agents,
independent of their preference intensities. A weaker incentive concept is lexicographic
dominance-strategyproofness (LD-strategyproofness), which requires that a mechanism
makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents who have lexicographic
preferences over the objects.1 In (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), we have introduced partial
strategyproofness, a new, intermediate incentive concept that parametrizes the spectrum
of incentive concepts between SD- and LD-strategyproofness.
Under all three incentive concepts, agents are not restricted in the kinds of misreports
that they may submit. Alternatively, one may suppose that agents only submit local
misreports that arise from their truthful preference order by inverting the order of
two adjacently ranked objects. Restricting attention to local misreports gives rise to
the notions of local SD-strategyproofness, local LD-strategyproofness, and local partial
strategyproofness. Obviously, each local incentive requirement is implied by its global
counterpart. However, the question arises whether the opposite also holds. If local
incentive constraints imply their global counterpart, we speak of local sufficiency. This
intriguing property can be used to greatly reduce the complexity of incentive concepts (see
(Carroll, 2012). From a computational perspective, local sufficiency reduces algorithmic
complexity because it reduces the number of constraints under the automated mechanism
design paradigm (Sandholm, 2003).
Carroll (2012) and Cho (2012) proved local sufficiency for SD- and LD-strategyproofness,
respectively. Thus, local incentive constraints are sufficient for the two limit concepts of
partial strategyproofness. In this paper, we contribute local sufficiency results for partial
strategyproofness. First, we prove that r-local partial strategyproofness always implies
r2-partial strategyproofness (for any r P r0, 1s). Second, we show that r2 is the tightest
polynomial bound for which such an implication can be guaranteed. Our results provide
a unified proof for the two prior local sufficiency results and illustrate an interesting
connection between local and global incentive constraints on the spectrum of incentive
concepts between the two limit concepts.
1Informally, agents are said to have lexicographic preferences if they prefer any (arbitrarily small)
increase in their chance to obtain a more preferred object to any (even large) increase in their chances
to obtain some less preferred objects. For example, an agent with lexicographic preferences would
prefer to receive its first choice with a probability of 1% or its third choice with a probability of 99%
to receiving its second choice for sure.
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2. Formal Model
We use the same model as in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017): A setting pN,M, qq consists of
a set of agents N (n “ #N), a set of objects M (m “ #M), and a vector q “ pq1, . . . , qmq
of capacities (i.e., there are qj units object j available). We assume n ď řjPM qj (i.e.,
there are not more agents than the total number of units); otherwise we include a dummy
object with capacity n. Each agent i P N has a strict preference order Pi over objects,
where Pi : a ą b indicates that agent i prefers object a to object b. Let P be the set of
all possible preference orders. A preference profile P “ pPiqiPN P PN is a collection of
preference orders from all agents and P´i P PNztiu is a collection of preference orders of all
agents except i. We extend agents’ preferences to lotteries via von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions: A utility function ui : M Ñ R` is consistent with a preference order
Pi if uipaq ą uipbq whenever Pi : a ą b, denoted ui „ Pi. UPi “ tui | ui „ Piu denotes
the set of all utility functions consistent with Pi.
A (random) assignment is represented by an n ˆm-matrix x “ pxi,jqiPN,jPM , where
no object is assigned beyond capacity (i.e.,
ř
iPN xi,j ď qj for all j PM) and each agent
receives some object with certainty (i.e.,
ř
jPM xi,j “ 1 for all i P N and xi,j ě 0 for all
i P N, j PM). The value xi,j is the probability that agent i gets object j. An assignment
x is deterministic if xi,j P t0, 1u for all i P N, j P M . The ith row xi “ pxi,jqjPM
of x is called the assignment vector of i (short: i’s assignment). The Birkhoff-von
Neumann Theorem and its extensions (Budish et al., 2013) ensure that for any random
assignment we can find a lottery over deterministic assignments that implements its
marginal probabilities. Finally, let X and ∆pXq denote the spaces of all deterministic
and random assignments, respectively.
A (random assignment) mechanism is a mapping ϕ : PN Ñ ∆pXq that selects an
assignment based on a preference profile. ϕipPi, P´iq denotes the assignment of agent i
when i reports Pi and the other agents report P´i. The mechanism ϕ is deterministic
if it selects deterministic assignments (i.e., ϕ : PN Ñ X). Note that we only consider
ordinal mechanisms, where the assignment only depends on the reported preference
profiles but is independent of the underlying utility functions. If agent i with utility
function ui reports Pi and the other agents report P´i, then agent i’s expected utility is
EϕipPi,P´iqruis “
ÿ
jPM
uipjq ¨ ϕi,jpPi, P´iq. (1)
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3. Notions of Strategyproofness
First, we define the standard notion of SD-strategyproofness.
Definition 1 (SD-Strategyproofness). For a preference order Pi and two assignment
vectors xi, yi, we say that xi stochastically dominates yi at Pi if, for all objects j P M ,
we have ÿ
j1PM s.t. Pi:j1ąj
xj1 ě
ÿ
j1PM s.t. Pi:j1ąj
yj1 . (2)
A mechanism ϕ is stochastic dominance strategyproof (SD-strategyproof ) if, for all
agents i P N , all preference profiles pPi, P´iq P PN , and all misreports P 1i P P , ϕipPi, P´iq
stochastically dominates ϕipP 1i , P´iq at Pi.
SD-strategyproofness can be equivalently defined in terms of expected utilities (Erdil,
2014): A mechanism is SD-strategyproof if and only if truthful reporting maximizes
any agent’s expected utility, independent of its preference order, its particular utility
function, or the reports from the other agents.
A second, weaker notion of strategyproofness requires that agents have a dominant
strategy to report truthfully when they have lexicographic preferences over objects (i.e.,
they prefer any arbitrarily small increase in their chances to receive a more preferred
object to any even large increase in their chance to receive any less preferred object).
Definition 2 (LD-Strategyproofness). For preference order Pi P P and assignment
vectors xi, yi, we say that xi lexicographically dominates yi at Pi if either xi “ yi, or
xi,a ą yi,a for some a PM and xi,j “ yi,j for all j P Upa, Piq “ tj PM | Pi : j ą au.
A mechanism ϕ is LD-strategyproof if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles
pPi, P´iq P PN , and all misreports P 1i P P, ϕipPi, P´iq lexicographically dominates
ϕipP 1i , P´iq at Pi.
Obviously, LD-strategyproofness is implied by SD-strategyproofness but the opposite
is not true.
The third incentive requirement that we define is partial strategyproofness. Intuitively,
a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy
for all agents who have sufficiently different values for any two different objects. Formally,
this corresponds to strategyproofness on a particular domain restriction.
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Definition 3 (URBI). A utility function ui satisfies uniformly relatively bounded in-
difference with respect to bound r P r0, 1s (URBI(r)) if, for all objects a, b P M with
uipaq ą uipbq, we have
r ¨
ˆ
uipaq ´min
jPM uipjq
˙
ě uipbq ´min
jPM uipjq. (3)
Definition 4 (Partially Strategyproof). Given a setting pN,M, qq and a bound r P r0, 1s,
a mechanism ϕ is r-partially strategyproof (in the setting pN,M, qq) if, for all agents
i P N , all preference profiles pPi, P´iq P PN , all misreports P 1i P P , and all utility function
ui P UPi X URBI(r), we have
EϕipPi,P´iqruis ě EϕipP 1i ,P´iqruis. (4)
ϕ is partially strategyproof if it is r-partially strategyproof for some positive bound r ą 0.
We have introduced partial strategyproofness in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), where we
have also shown that it is a meaningful relaxation of strategyproofness for assignment
mechanisms. In particular, the degree of strategyproofness (i.e., the value r) parametrizes
the space of incentive requirements between SD-strategyproofness (r “ 1) and LD-
strategyproofness (r Œ 0). Thus, partial strategyproofness yields a spectrum of incentive
concepts with SD- and LD-strategyproofness as upper and lower limit concepts.
To simplify an incentive requirement, mechanism designers may choose to consider
only local misreports and require truthful reporting to be a dominant strategy in this
restricted strategy space. For the assignment domain, a natural notion of locality arises
when agents are limited to inverting the order of just one pair of consecutively ranked
objects: For any preference order Pi P P , the neighborhood of Pi, denoted NPi , consists of
all preference orders that differ from Pi by a swap of two consecutively ranked objects.
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Definition 5 (Local SD- & Local LD-Strategyproofness). A mechanism ϕ is locally
strategyproof if, for all agents i P N , all preference profiles pPi, P´iq P PN , all misreports
P 1i P NPi from the neighborhood of Pi, and all utility functions ui P UPi that are consistent
with Pi, we have
EpPi,P´iqruis ´ EpP 1i ,P´iqruis ě 0. (5)
2For example, P 1i : b ą a ą c is in the neighborhood of Pi : a ą b ą c, but P 2i : c ą a ą b and
P3i : c ą b ą a are not.
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ϕ is locally LD-strategyproof if ϕipPi, P´iq lexicographically dominates ϕipP 1i , P´iq for all
agents i, preference profiles pPi, P´iq, and local misreports P 1i P NPi .
Analogously, we can define a local variant of partial strategyproofness.
Definition 6 (Local Partial Strategyproofness). Given a setting pN,M, qq and a bound
r P p0, 1q, a mechanism ϕ is r-locally partially strategyproof if, for all agents i P N , all
preference profiles pPi, P´iq P PN , all misreports P 1i P NPi from the neighborhood of
Pi, and all utility functions ui P UPi X URBI(r) that are consistent with Pi and satisfy
URBI(r), we have
EϕipPi,P´iqruis ´ EϕipP 1i ,P´iqruis ě 0. (6)
We say that ϕ is locally partially strategyproof if it is r-locally partially strategyproof for
some non-trivial r ą 0.
4. Local Sufficiency
Local incentive requirements, such as local SD-strategyproofness, are obviously not
more demanding than their global counterparts. However, the question arises whether
these concepts are strict relaxations or whether local incentive requirements are in fact
sufficient to imply the respective global requirements. Carroll (2012) and Cho (2012)
proved local sufficiency for SD- and LD-strategyproofness, respectively, and Facts 1 and
2 summarize their results.
Fact 1 (Carroll, 2012). Local SD-strategyproofness is sufficient for SD-strategyproofness.
Fact 2 (Cho, 2012). Local LD-strategyproofness is sufficient for LD-strategyproofness.
Since local incentive constraints are obviously necessary for SD- and LD-strategyproofness,
local sufficiency implies equivalence.
We are now ready to formulate our local sufficiency results for partial strategyproof-
ness. First, we observe that Fact 2 (in combination with other insights about partial
strategyproofness) immediately yields a weak form of local sufficiency.
Corollary 1. Given a setting pN,M, qq, if a mechanism ϕ is r-locally partially strate-
gyproof for some r ą 0, then it is r1-partially strategyproof for some r1 ą 0.
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Corollary 1 follows from the observation that local partial strategyproofness implies
local LD-strategyproofness (Theorem 4 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017)), which implies
LD-strategyproofness (by Fact 2), which in turn implies partial strategyproofness (again
by Theorem 4 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017)). However, the local bound r and the global
bound r1 are not necessarily the same. Since r1-partial strategyproofness implies r1-local
partial strategyproofness, we must have r1 ď r, but r1 may still be substantially smaller
than r. Our next result establishes a precise connection between r and r1.
Theorem 1. Given a setting pN,M, qq, if a mechanism ϕ is r-locally partially strate-
gyproof, then it is r2-partially strategyproof.
We give the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A.
Theorem 1 means that r-local partial strategyproofness is sufficient to guarantee
r1-partial strategyproofness for any r1 ď r2. As a special case, we obtain that 1-local
partial strategyproofness implies 1-partial strategyproofness, the local sufficiency result
for strategyproofness (Fact 1). Furthermore, considering a sequence of bounds prkqkě1
that approaches 0, we obtain the local sufficiency result for LD-strategyproofness in the
limit (Fact 2). Thus, Theorem 1 unifies both prior results.
The question remains whether Theorem 1 is tight or whether the bound r1 ď r2 can be
improved in any way. First, note that it is straightforward to construct a counter-example
to show that exact equality (i.e., r1 “ r, and therefore equivalence) is out of the question,
unless r P t0, 1u. In fact, as we show in the next Theorem 2, the bound r1 “ r2 is tight in
the sense that ‘2’ is the smallest exponent for which a universal guarantee can be given.
Theorem 2. Given a setting pN,M, qq with m ě 4 objects, for any ε ą 0 there exists a
bound r P p0, 1q and a mechanism ϕ such that
1. ϕ is r-locally partially strategyproof, but
2. ϕ is not r2´ε-partially strategyproof.
Tightness by Theorem 2 means that r1 “ r2 is the best polynomial bound that allows a
general statement about local sufficiency of the partial strategyproofness concept. We
give the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix B.
Remark 1. Observe that the value r in the counter-examples in the proof of Theorem 2
may depend on ε. We leave the exploration of the relationship between r and r1 for fixed
r to future research.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. We must verify that an r-locally partially strategyproof mechanism
ϕ satisfies the conditions for r2-partial strategyproofness, i.e., for all agents i P N , all
preference profiles P “ pPi, P´iq P PN , all misreports P 1i P P, and all utility functions
ui P UPi with ui P URBIpr2q, the inequality
EϕipPi,P´iqruis ´ EϕipP 1i ,P´iqruis ě 0 (7)
holds. Without loss of generality, we can assume that minjPM uipjq “ 0, since the
manipulation incentives are exactly the same for an agent with utility function u˜i “
ui ´minjPM uipjq.
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To simplify notation, we fix an arbitrary combination of agent i, preference profile
pP Ti , P´iq, misreport P Fi , and utility function ui P UPTi X URBIpr2q to satisfy these
preconditions. We drop the index i on the preference orders, utility functions, and
mechanism, and we omit the preferences of the other agents. With this simplification,
inequality (7) becomes
EϕpPT qrus ´ EϕpPF qrus ě 0 (8)
Recall that UPT denotes the set of utility functions that are consistent with P
T , i.e.,
UPT “
 
w : M Ñ R` | w „ P T( , (9)
and U denotes the utility space, i.e., the union of all consistent utility functions
U “
ď
PPP
UP . (10)
We say that a utility function w : M Ñ R` implies indifference between two different
objects a, b P M if wpaq “ wpbq, and we denote by W “ tw : M Ñ R`u the extended
utility space, i.e., the set of all possible utility functions, including those that imply
indifference.
Given the fixed preference order P T and consistent utility function u P UPT , let v be a
utility function that is consistent with the misreport P F and let
copu, vq “ tuα “ p1´ αqu` αv | α P r0, 1su (11)
be the convex line segment in W that connects u and v. This line segment starts in UPT ,
then (for increasing α) traverses the extended utility space W and eventually ends at
v in UPF . copu, vq is said to pass a preference order P if, for some value α P r0, 1s, we
have that uα is consistent with P , or equivalently, if uα P UP . By construction, copu, vq
passes a sequence of preference orders P T “ P 0, P 1, . . . , PK´1, PK “ P F in this order,
i.e., as α increases, uα is first consistent with P
0, then with P 1, etc., until it is consistent
with PK “ P F . Note that intermittently, it is possible that uα is not consistent with
any preference order as it may imply indifference. By linearity, we have that, for any
two objects a, b P M with upaq ą upbq but vpaq ă vpbq, there exists a unique α P p0, 1q
for which uα implies indifference between a and b, for any smaller α
´ ă α we have
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uα´paq ą uα´pbq, and for any larger α` ą α we have uα`paq ă uα`pbq.
We are now ready to formally define two requirements that we use in the proof:
• We say that copu, vq makes no simultaneous transitions if, for any three different
objects a, b, c PM , we have
copu, vq X tw P W | wpaq “ wpbq “ wpcqu “ H. (12)
In words, for no value of the parameter α does uα imply indifference between
all three objects a, b, c. Intuitively, this means that two consecutive preference
orders P k, P k`1 in the sequence pP 0, . . . , PKq differ by exactly one swap of two
consecutively ranked objects.
• We say that copu, vq passes P k in URBI(r) if it passes P k and there exists some
αk P r0, 1s such that uαk P UPk X URBI(r). This means that the line segment
contains at least one utility function that is consistent with P k and in addition
satisfies URBI(r).
Suppose in the following that u is consistent with P T and satisfies URBIpr2q, and that
the mechanism ϕ is r-locally partially strategyproof.
Claim 1. There exists v P UPF X URBI(r) such that
i. copu, vq makes no simultaneous transitions,
ii. if copu, vq passes a preference order P , then it passes P in URBI(r).
Using Claim 1, we can now show the inequality
EϕpPT qrus ´ EϕpPF qrus ě 0. (13)
We will show this by writing the left side as a telescoping sum over local incentive
constraints, where all but the first and the last term cancel out, such that it collapses
to yield the inequality. This idea is inspired by the proof of local sufficiency for
strategyproofness in (Carroll, 2012).
Consider the utility function v constructed in Claim 1 and the convex line segment
copu, vq. Let α0 “ 0, αK “ 1, and for each k P t0, . . . , Ku let αk be the parameters
for which uαk P UPk X URBI(r), which exist by statement ii in Claim 1. For any
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k P t0, . . . , K ´ 1u, the preference orders P k and P k`1 are neighbors of each other, i.e.,
P k P NPk`1 and P k`1 P NPk (by statement i in Claim 1). Thus, by r-local partial
strategyproofness of ϕ, we obtain
EϕpPkqruαks ´ EϕpPk`1qruαks ě 0 (14)
and
EϕpPk`1qruαk`1s ´ EϕpPkqruαk`1s ě 0. (15)
Multiplying by αk and ´αk`1, respectively, and adding both inequalities yields
EϕpPk`1qrαkuαk`1 ´ αk`1uαks ´ EϕpPkqrαkuαk`1 ´ αk`1uαks ě 0. (16)
Now, observe that αkuαk`1 ´ αk`1uαk “ pαk ´ αk`1q ¨ u and, therefore,
EϕpPk`1qrus ´ EϕpPkqrus ě 0 (17)
for all k P t0, . . . , K ´ 1u. Summing over all k, we get
EϕpPT qrus ´ EϕpPF qrus “
K´1ÿ
k“0
EϕpPk`1qrus ´ EϕpPkqrus ě 0 (18)
We now proceed to prove Claim 1.
Proof of Claim 1. The proof of existence of v is constructive. For a preference order P ,
the rank of an object j under P is the position that j holds in the ranking, i.e.,
rankP pjq “ # tj1 PM | P : j1 ą ju ` 1. (19)
Define v : M Ñ R` by setting
vpjq “ Cm´rankPF pjq (20)
for any j PM and some C ą 1 (so that v P UPF ). Furthermore, observe that v P URBI(r)
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for sufficiently large C, since for any a, b PM with P 1 : a ą b, we have
vpbq ´minjPM vpjq
vpaq ´minjPM vpjq “
CrankPF pbq ´ 1
CrankPF paq ´ 1 “ o p1{Cq . (21)
It remains to be shown that, for sufficiently large C, statements i and ii in Claim 1 hold.
To prove both statements, we use the concept of the canonical transitions : For any two
preference orders P, P 1 P P , a transition from P 1 to P is a finite sequence of preference
orders P 0, . . . , PK such that
• P 0 “ P 1 and PK “ P ,
• for all k P t0, . . . , K ´ 1u, we have P k P NPk`1 .
Intuitively, such a transition resembles a series of consecutive swaps that transform the
preference order P 1 into the preference order P . The canonical transition (from P 1 to P )
is a particular transition that is inspired by the bubble-sort algorithm: Initially, we set
P 0 “ P 1. The preference orders P 1, . . . , PK are constructed in phases. In the first phase,
we identify the highest ranking object under P that is not ranked in the same position
under P 1, say j. Then, we construct the preference orders P 1, P 2, . . . by swapping j with
the respective next more preferred objects. When j has reached the same position under
P k as under P , the first phase ends. Likewise, at the beginning of the second phase, we
identify the object that is ranked highest under P of those objects that are not ranked
in the same positions under P k. New preference orders are constructed by swapping
this object up to its final position under P . Subsequent phases are analogous. The
construction ends when the most recently created preference order PK and P coincides
with P .
In addition, we formalize transition times : Suppose that, for two objects a, b PM , we
have P T : a ą b but P F : b ą a, such that upaq ą upbq but vpaq ă vpbq. Recall that in
this case, there exists a unique parameter α for which uαpaq “ uαpbq, for any smaller
α´ ă α we have uα´paq ą uα´pbq, and for any larger α` ą α we have uα`paq ă uα`pbq.
The line segment copu, vq pierces the hyperplane of indifference between a and b at the
point uα, i.e., it transitions from preference orders that rank a above b to preference
orders that rank b above a. Formally, the transition time αpa, b, 1q is the parameter for
which uαpa,b,1qpaq “ uαpa,b,1qpbq. Extending this notation, we define αpa, b, rq as the first
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time when uα violates the URBI(r) constraint for a ą b, i.e.,
αpa, b, rq “ inf
"
α P r0, 1s
ˇˇˇˇ
uαpbq ´minjPM uαpjq
uαpaq ´minjPM uαpjq ą r
*
, (22)
and αpb, a, rq as the last time when uα violates the URBI(r) constraint for b ą a, i.e.,
αpa, b, rq “ sup
"
α P r0, 1s
ˇˇˇˇ
uαpaq ´minjPM uαpjq
uαpbq ´minjPM uαpjq ą r
*
. (23)
Obviously,
αpa, b, rq ă αpa, b, 1q ă αpb, a, rq, (24)
i.e., as α increases, uα violates URBI(r) for a ą b at some time, then subsequently it
transitions from a ą b to b ą a, and finally it no longer violates the URBI(r) constraint
for b ą a.
We are now ready to formulate Claims 2, 3, and 4, which are needed to establish
statement i (no simultaneous transitions) and statement ii (passing all preference orders
in URBI(r)) in Claim 1, respectively, and the fact that the only relevant pairs of objects
are those that are ranked differently under P T and P F .
Claim 2. For sufficiently large C, copu, vq induces the canonical transition
P 0 “ P T , P 1, . . . , PK´1, PK “ P F . (25)
Claim 3. For sufficiently large C, if αpa, b, 1q ă αpc, d, 1q, then
αpa, b, rq ď αpc, d, rq. (26)
Claim 4. If P T : a ą b and P F : a ą b and u, v P URBI(r), then for all α P r0, 1s
uαpbq ´minjPM uαpjq
uαpaq ´minjPM uαpjq ď r. (27)
Since copu, vq induces a transition by Claim 2, we already know that for all pairs
pa, bq ‰ pc, dq we have αpa, b, 1q ‰ αpc, d, 1q. Thus, copu, vq makes no simultaneous
transitions.
If a is preferred to b under both P T and P F , then, by Claim 4, the URBI(r) constraint
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for a over b is satisfied for any α. Suppose now that P T : a ą b, P T : c ą d, P F : b ą a,
P F : d ą c, and αpa, b, 1q ă αpc, d, 1q. Then copu, vq enters a new set of consistent utility
functions UPk at time αpa, b, 1q, where P k differs from P k´1 by a swap of a and b, and
copu, vq leaves UPk at time αpc, d, 1q, where P k differs from P k`1 by a swap of c and d. In
this case, the URBI(r) constraint for b over a is satisfied after time αpa, b, rq ą αpa, b, 1q,
and the URBI(r) constraint for c over d is satisfied before time αpc, d, rq ă αpc, d, 1q.
Claim 3 yields that the constraint for c over d holds long enough for the constraint for b
over a to be restored. Thus, at any time αk P rαpa, b, rq, αpc, d, rqs ‰ H, both constraints
are satisfied. Iterated application of this argument yields that, for any k P t0, . . . , Ku,
there exists some αk for which uαk satisfies URBI(r) with respect to preference order P
k.
This concludes the proof of Claim 1.
We now provide the proofs of Claims 2 and 3. Claim 4 is obvious.
Proof of Claim 2. First, we formulate an equivalent condition for copu, vq to induce the
canonical condition in terms of transition times αpa, b, 1q.
Claim 5. The following are equivalent:
1. copu, vq induces the canonical transition
P 0 “ P T , P 1, . . . , PK´1, PK “ P F . (28)
2. For any a, b, c, d PM with P T : a ą b, P T : c ą d, P F : b ą a, P F : d ą c,
i. if P F : b ą d, then αpa, b, 1q ă αpc, d, 1q,
ii. if b “ d and P T : c ą a, then αpa, b, 1q ă αpc, d, 1q.
Proof of Claim 5. First, we show sufficiency (“ñ”). To see that statement 2i holds,
observe that, since P F : b ą d, b will be brought up by bubble sort before d is ever
swapped up against another object. Since P T : c ą d, the swap of c Ø d is such a
swap and, therefore, it has to occur after the swap a Ø b. Statement 2ii follows by
observing that from b “ d and P T : c ą a we get that P T : c ą a ą b, but ultimately
P F : b ą pa, cq. The bubble sort algorithm will bring b up by swapping it with a before
it swaps b and c.
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To see necessity (“ð”), let a Ø b and c Ø d be two swaps that occur at αpa, b, 1q
and αpc, d, 1q, respectively. If P F : b ą d, then statement 2i implies that aØ b occurs
before cØ d, which is consistent with the canonical transition. By symmetry, the case
P F : d ą b also follows. Next, observe that any case not covered by this argument
involves identity of b and d, i.e., b “ d. If a “ c as well, then there is nothing to show,
so assume P T : a ą c, where 2ii implies the correct behavior. The last remaining case
where b “ d and P T : c ą a follows again by symmetry.
This concludes the proof of Claim 5.
We now verify that the sequence of types through which copu, vq passes is indeed a
canonical transition. Let a, b, c, d PM be such that P T : a ą b, P T : c ą d, P F : b ą a,
P F : d ą c, and either P F : b ą d (as in 2i of Claim 5) or b “ d and P T : c ą a (as in 2ii
of Claim 5). We can write
αpa, b, 1q “ upaq ´ upbq
upaq ´ upbq ` vpbq ´ vpaq and αpc, d, 1q “
upcq ´ updq
upcq ´ updq ` vpdq ´ vpcq , (29)
and we need to show that
αpa, b, 1q ă αpc, d, 1q (30)
ô pupaq ´ upbqq pupcq ´ updq ` vpdq ´ vpcqq (31)
ă pupcq ´ updqq pupaq ´ upbq ` vpbq ´ vpaqq (32)
ô pupaq ´ upbqq pvpdq ´ vpcqq ă pupcq ´ updqq pvpbq ´ vpaqq (33)
ô upaq ´ upbq
upcq ´ updq ă
vpdq ´ vpcq
vpbq ´ vpaq . (34)
If P T : b ą d, the left side of (34) grows faster than C, i.e.,
vpdq ´ vpcq
vpbq ´ vpaq “
Cm´rankPF pdq ´ Cm´rankPF pcq
Cm´rankPF pbq ´ Cm´rankPF paq “ ωpCq, (35)
since rankPF pbq ă rankPF pdq, rankPF pbq ă rankPF paq, and rankPF pdq ă rankPF pcq.
Similarly, if b “ d and P T : c ą a, we obtain that
vpdq ´ vpcq
vpbq ´ vpaq “
Cm´rankPF pbq ´ Cm´rankPF pcq
Cm´rankPF pbq ´ Cm´rankPF paq “ ωpCq. (36)
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Since the right side in (34) is not small for sufficiently large C, we can ensure that
αpa, b, 1q ă αpc, d, 1q whenever the statements 2i or 2ii in Claim 5 hold.
Proof of Claim 3. First we define a conservative estimate for the violation times αpa, b, rq
and αpc, d, rq. Let
spa, b, αq “ uαpbq
uαpaq (37)
and observe that spa, b, αq is continuous and strictly monotonic in α and spa, b, αpa, b, 1qq “
1. Thus, we can define the inverse αpa, b, sq for which spa, b, αpa, b, sqq “ s for any value
of s that is attained by spa, b, αq. In particular for α “ 0, spa, b, 0q “ upbq
upaq ď r and for
α “ 1, spa, b, 1q “ vpbq
vpaq ą 1r , so αpa, b, sq is well-defined for all values s P
“
r, 1
r
‰
. In fact,
we can solve
uαpa,b,sqpbq
uαpa,b,sqpaq “ s (38)
for αpa, b, sq and obtain the expression
αpa, b, sq “ supaq ´ upbq
supaq ´ upbq ` vpbq ´ svpaq . (39)
Using minuα ě 0,
spa, b, αq “ uαpbq
uαpbq ď r (40)
implies
uαpbq ´minjPM uαpjq
uαpbq ´minjPM uαpjq ď r, (41)
and therefore,
αpa, b, rq ď αpb, a, rq and αpc, d, rq ď αpc, d, rq. (42)
We now show that, for sufficiently large C, αpb, a, rq ď αpc, d, rq holds. Recall that we
are considering objects a, b, c, d P M , where P T : a ą b, P T : c ą d, P F : b ą a, and
P F : d ą c, so that the required inequality can be rewritten equivalently as
αpb, a, rq ď αpc, d, rq ô upaq ´ rupbq
rupcq ´ updq ď
rvpbq ´ vpaq
vpdq ´ rvpcq . (43)
By Claim 2, copu, vq induces the canonical transition for sufficiently large C. Thus, by
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Claim 5, αpa, b, 1q ă αpc, d, 1q holds if
i. either P F : b ą d,
ii. or b “ d and P T : c ą a.
In case i we observe that the left side of (43) is constant, but the right side grows in C,
i.e., it is in ωpCq. Therefore, (43) is ultimately satisfied for sufficiently large C.
In case ii the right side converges to r (from below) as C becomes large. Thus, it
suffices to verify
upaq ´ rupbq
rupcq ´ upbq ď r (44)
ô upaq ´ rupbq ď r2upcq ´ rupbq (45)
ô 0 ď r2upcq ´ upaq. (46)
Using the assumption that u satisfies URBIpr2q, minjPM upjq “ 0, and P T : c ą a, we
get that
upcq
upaq ď r
2 ô r2upcq ´ upaq ě 0. (47)
This concludes the proof of Claim 3.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider a mechanism ϕ that selects the following assignments:
ϕpa ą . . .q “ pα, 0, 0, 1´ αq , (48)
ϕpb ą . . .q “ p0, β, 0, 1´ βq , (49)
ϕpd ą . . .q “ p0, 0, 0, 1q , (50)
ϕpc ą d ą . . .q “ p0, 0, γc, 1´ γcq , (51)
ϕpc ą a ą d ą bq “ p1´ γc ´ γd, 0, γc, γdq , (52)
ϕpc ą b ą . . .q “ ϕpc ą a ą b ą dq “ p1´ γc ´ γd, γd, γc, 0q (53)
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for the objects a, b, c, d, respectively, where
α, β, γc, γd P r0, 1s, (54)
s “ 1
r
, (55)
β “ sα, (56)
γc “ p1´ αqps´ 1q ps ps` 1q ´ 1q , (57)
γd “ s ps` 1q p1´ αq
s ps` 1q ´ 1 . (58)
Observe that ϕ is entirely specified by the values of r and α. We will now show that, for
sufficiently small r ą 0, we can chose α such that
1. ϕ is feasible,
2. ϕ is r-locally partially strategyproof,
3. but not r2´ε-partially strategyproof.
First, we verify statement 1 that ϕ is feasible.
Claim 6. For s ą 1, ϕ is feasible if and only if α P “ s
s3´s`1 ,
1
s
‰
.
Proof of Claim 6. Note that for s ą 1 and α ă 1, γc and γd are positive. We must
ensure that β “ sα ď 1, which is the case if and only if α ď 1
s
. Next, we give a condition
for γc ` γd ď 1, which in turn implies feasibility of the mechanism. This inequality
holds if and only if α ě s
s3´s`1 . Observing that
1
s
ą s
s3´s`1 for s ą 1, we have that the
mechanism ϕ is feasible if and only if α P “ s
s3´s`1 ,
1
s
‰ ‰ H.
Second, we give equivalent conditions for r-local partial strategyproofness of ϕ, i.e.,
statement 2.
Claim 7. For sufficiently small r, the following are equivalent:
i. ϕ is feasible and r-locally partially strategyproof,
ii. α P Is “
„
s4´s3
s5`2s4´s2´s´1 ,
s3´s` s2
s´1`1
s4`s3´s2`s` s2
s´1

.
Furthermore, for sufficiently small r ą 0, Is ‰ H.
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Preference report I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
a ą . . . * * * *
b ą . . . * * *
d ą . . . * * *
c ą d ą . . . * *
c ą a ą d ą b * *
c ą b ą . . . or c ą a ą b ą d * * * *
Table 1: Cases for local manipulations
Proof of Claim 7. We use Theorem 4 of (Mennle and Seuken, 2017) to establish r-
discounted dominance for any manipulation by just a swap, which in turn yields r-local
partial strategyproofness. We only need to consider those swaps that lead to a change
of the assignment, otherwise there is nothing to show. In the following, δk denotes the
adjusted kth partial sum, i.e., for P : j1 ą . . . ą jm,
δk “
kÿ
l“1
sk´l pϕjlpP q ´ ϕjlpP 1qq “ r´k
˜
kÿ
l“1
rl pϕjlpP q ´ ϕjlpP 1qq
¸
. (59)
Observe that positivity of δ1, δ2, δ3 is equivalent to r-partial dominance of ϕjlpP q over
ϕjlpP 1q at P by Theorem 4 of (Mennle and Seuken, 2017). Table 1 lists all the cases we
need to consider.
I. • a ą b ą . . .ù b ą a ą . . . :
δ1 “ α ě 0, (60)
δ2 “ sα ´ β “ 0 ě 0, (61)
δ3 “ p1´ αq ´ p1´ βq “ β ´ α ě 0. (62)
For δ3, we assumed that the third choice is d, otherwise there is nothing to
show.
19
• b ą a ą . . .ù a ą b ą . . . :
δ1 “ β ě 0, (63)
δ2 “ sβ ´ α “ αps2 ´ 1q ě 0, (64)
δ3 “ s2β ´ sα ` α ´ β “ αps3 ´ 2s` 1q ě 0. (65)
For δ3, we assumed that the third choice was d, otherwise there is nothing to
show.
II. a ą . . .ú d ą . . . : ϕpa ą . . .q first-order stochastically dominates ϕpd ą . . .q for
all preference orders where a is preferred to d, and vice versa.
III. • a ą c ą d ą bù c ą a ą d ą b :
δ1 “ α ´ p1´ γc ´ γdq (66)
“ α ´ 1` p1´ αq
ˆps´ 1q´1 ` sps` 1q
sps` 1q ´ 1
˙
ě 0, (67)
since
ps´ 1q´1 ` sps` 1q ě sps` 1q ´ 1 ô ps´ 1q´1 ě ´1. (68)
δ2 “ spα ´ 1` γc ` γdq ´ γc (69)
“ p1´ αqs
ˆps´ 1q´1 ` sps` 1q ´ ps´ 1q´1s´1
sps` 1q ´ 1 ´ 1
˙
(70)
“ p1´ αqs
ˆ
sps` 1q ` s´1
sps` 1q ´ 1 ´ 1
˙
ě 0, (71)
δ3 “ sδ2 ě 0. (72)
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• c ą a ą d ą bù a ą c ą d ą b :
δ1 “ γc ě 0, (73)
δ2 “ sγc ` 1´ γc ´ γd ´ α (74)
“ pa´ αq
ˆ
1` 1´ sps` 1q
sps` 1q ´ 1
˙
“ 0 (75)
δ3 “ γd ´ 1` α, (76)
“ p1´ αq
ˆ
sps` 1q
sps` 1q ´ 1 ´ 1
˙
ě 0. (77)
IV. • a ą c ą b ą dù c ą a ą b ą d :
δ1 “ α ´ p1´ γc ´ γdq ě 0, (78)
δ2 “ spα ´ 1` γc ` γdq ´ γc ě 0, (79)
as in case III, and
δ3 “ s2pα ´ 1` γc ` γdq ´ sγc ` p1´ αq ´ γd (80)
“ p1´ αq
ˆ
1´ s2 ` s` ps
2 ´ 1qsps` 1q
sps` 1q ´ 1
˙
(81)
“ p1´ αq
ˆ
s2 ` s´ 1
sps` 1q ´ 1
˙
“ 1´ α ě 0. (82)
• c ą a ą b ą dù a ą c ą b ą d :
δ1 “ γc ě 0 (83)
δ2 “ sγc ` p1´ γc ´ γdq ´ α (84)
“ p1´ αq
˜
1`
s
s´1 ´ 1s´1 ´ sps` 1q
sps` 1q ´ 1
¸
(85)
“ p1´ αq
ˆ
1` 1´ sps` 1q
sps` 1q ´ 1
˙
“ p1´ αqp1´ 1q “ 0 ě 0, (86)
δ3 “ 0` γd ě 0. (87)
V. b ą . . .ú d ą . . . : ϕpb ą . . .q first-order stochastically dominates ϕpd ą . . .q for
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all preference orders where b is preferred to d, and vice versa.
VI. • b ą c ą . . .ù c ą b ą . . . : We begin with δ3 as its positivity also implies
positivity of δ1 and δ2. Furthermore, the strictest condition arises from the
preference order b ą c ą a ą d.
δ3 “ s2pβ ´ γdq ` sp´γcq ` p´1` γc ` γdq (88)
“ α
ˆ
s5 ` 2s4 ´ s2 ´ s´ 1
sps` 1q ´ 1
˙
´ s
4 ´ s3
sps` 1q ´ 1 ě 0 (89)
holds if and only if
α ě s
4 ´ s3
s5 ` 2s4 ´ s2 ´ s´ 1 . (90)
• c ą b ą . . .ù b ą c ą . . . :
δ1 “ γc ě 0. (91)
We can consider the case where d is the third choice as this condition is stirctly
stronger than if a is the third choice. It suffices to consider δ3 as its positivity
implies positivity of δ2.
δ3 “ s2γc ` sγd ´ sβ ´ p1´ βq (92)
“ α
˜´s4 ´ s3 ` s2 ´ s´ s2
s´1
sps` 1q ´ 1
¸
`
˜
s3 ´ s` s2
s´1 ` 1
sps` 1q ´ 1
¸
ě 0 (93)
holds if and only if
α ď s
3 ´ s` s2
s´1 ` 1
s4 ` s3 ´ s2 ` s` s2
s´1
. (94)
VII. d ą c ą . . . ú c ą d ą . . . : ϕpd ą . . .q first-order stochastically dominates
ϕpc ą d ą . . .q for all preference orders where d is preferred to c, and vice versa.
VIII. • c ą d ą b ą aù c ą b ą d ą a :
δ1 “ γc ´ γc ě 0, (95)
δ2 “ 1´ γc ´ 0 ě 0, (96)
δ3 “ sp1´ γcq ` γd ě 0. (97)
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• c ą b ą d ą aù c ą d ą b ą a :
δ1 “ γc ´ γc ě 0, (98)
δ2 “ γd ´ 0 ě 0, (99)
δ3 “ sγd ´ p1´ γcq (100)
“ α
˜´s2ps` 1q ´ 1
s´1
sps` 1q ´ 1
¸
`
˜
s2ps` 1q ´ 1
s´1 ´ sps` 1q ` 1
sps` 1q ´ 1
¸
,(101)
which is positive if and only if
α ď s
3 ´ s` 1´ 1
s´1
s3 ` s2 ´ 1
s´1
. (102)
IX. • c ą a ą d ą bù c ą a ą b ą d :
δ1 “ γc ´ γc ě 0, (103)
δ2 “ 1´ γc ´ γd ´ 1` γc ` γd ě 0, (104)
δ3 “ γd ě 0. (105)
• c ą a ą b ą dù c ą a ą d ą d :
δ1 “ γc ´ γc ě 0, (106)
δ2 “ 1´ γc ´ γd ´ 1` γc ` γd ě 0, (107)
δ3 “ γd ě 0. (108)
In summary, all local incentive constraints are satisfied if and only if
s4 ´ s3
s5 ` 2s4 ´ s2 ´ s´ 1 ď α ď min
#
s3 ´ s` 1´ 1
s´1
s3 ` s2 ´ 1
s´1
,
s3 ´ s` s2
s´1 ` 1
s4 ` s3 ´ s2 ` s` s2
s´1
+
. (109)
The stronger upper bound is the second: Asymptotically, as s grows, it behaves like 1
s`1 ,
which converges to 0, while the first bound converges to 1. The stronger upper bound is
also stronger than the upper bound for feasibility, since 1
s`1 is smaller than
1
s
The lower
bound behaves like 1
s`2 , which is greater than
1
s2´1 , the asymptotic of the lower bound
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for feasibility. Finally, observe that the lower bound behaves like 1
s`2 , which is strictly
less than the asymptotic of the upper bound 1
s`1 . Thus, for sufficiently large s, α can be
chosen such that ϕ is r-locally partially strategyproof, which in turn implies feasibility.
This concludes the proof of Claim 7.
It remains to be shown that, for given ε ą 0, there exist r and α such that ϕ is r-locally
partially strategyproof (and therefore feasible), but not r2´ε-partially strategyproof, i.e.,
statement 3. To see this, we let s˜ “ s2´ε and consider the preference order a ą b ą c ą d
and the non-local misreport c ą a ą b ą d. If ϕ is r˜-partially strategyproof, then in
particular we must have δ3 ě 0 for this manipulation. However, extensive algebraic
transformations yield
δ3 “ s˜2 pα ´ 1` γc ` γdq ` s˜ p´γdq ` p´γcq (110)
“ p1´ αq
ˆ´s5´ε ` s5´2ε ` s3´ε ´ 1
s3 ´ 2s` 1
˙
. (111)
Since the leading term with exponent 5´ ε has negative sign, this value is negative for
sufficiently large s, and this negativity of δ3 is independent of α.
In conclusion, given a value of ε ą 0, we can find r ą 0 and α P p0, 1q such that
the resulting mechanism ϕ is feasible and r-locally partially strategyproof, but it is not
r2´ε-partially strategyproof.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
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